From Migration Hub to Asylum Crisis: The Changing Dynamics of Contemporary Migration in Yemen by Thiollet, Hélène
fourteen
From Migration Hub to 
Asylum Crisis: The Changing 
Dynamics of Contemporary 
Migration in Yemen
Hélène !iollet
Historically, Yemen has been a country of emigration, immigra-
tion and transit. ;e fate of Yemeni society has been tied to emigration, 
as well as to the presence and activities of a Yemeni diaspora scattered 
throughout the world, in the Gulf countries mainly since the 1950s, in 
Asia and Africa, and also in the United States and Europe. Yemen’s 
migration history seems to have reached a stalemate in the past two 
decades as, gradually since the 1990s, the borders of oil-producing 
countries have become largely closed to Yemenis. 
Since the early 1990s the country has also had to deal with a 
substantial in@ux of refugees from the Horn of Africa, who have con-
tinued to seek asylum in a country plagued by its own political crisis. 
In addition, from 2000 onwards, there has been signiBcant internal 
displacement as the country unravels – as a result of the Sa‘ada war 
in the north since 2004, and the southern insurrection since 2007. 
Most recently, the national uprising of 2011 has also had side eEects 
involving additional displacement. Forced and economic migration 
are connected in Yemen, as the country plays a strategic role in the 
management of migratory and traFcking @ows between the Horn of 
Africa and the Arabian peninsula.
In the Brst part of this chapter, I examine the historical structure of 
mobility to and from Yemen, and assess the importance of migration 
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as a core element of the country’s domestic and international proBle. 
In the second part, I examine refugee movements from the endemic 
humanitarian crisis in the Horn of Africa; for these refugees, Yemen 
represents a staging-post and, paradoxically, a ‘safe haven’. Finally, I 
consider the local and regional impact of a new trend of mobility – 
internal displacement – as a consequence of the various con@icts that 
have been taking place in the country relating to the 2011 uprisings.
Yemen as a Migration Hub: Migrants, Oil and 
Regional Politics
Long-term immigration and emigration patterns highlight the extent 
to which Yemen has been embedded in international commercial and 
cultural exchange networks as far back as the medieval period. Histor-
ically a commercial crossroads, Yemen sits at a junction between three 
continents – Europe, Asia and Africa – and two maritime expanses 
– the Indian Ocean and the Red  (and then Mediterranean) Sea. It is a 
zone of exchange and mobility, channelling economic, Bnancial and 
human @ows. Emigration from Yemen therefore has a long history, 
and has traditionally followed a number of diEerent routes. ;e main 
overland route consists of the caravan trails to the Gulf and the Near 
East. By sea there have been many destinations: the maritime routes of 
the Red Sea to Egypt and onward to the Berber parts of the Maghreb, 
to Africa (East Africa and the Horn), to the Indian subcontinent and 
Southeast Asia, to Europe and North America, and, from the middle 
of the twentieth century, to the oil-exporting countries of the Arabian 
peninsula.
Yemeni migration to Asia has been studied extensively.1 It has 
mainly been in the direction of Muslim societies such as Malaysia, 
the western part of India, and Indonesia, where – real or imagined 
– descendants of the Prophet Muhammad from the region of Had-
ramaut form trading and religious elites to this day.2 In Yemen itself, 
the Banyan merchants from India, who Brst settled in the sixteenth 
century, have also long played a central role in retail and commerce 
throughout the country. ;e city of Aden in particular was a major 
port of entry for exchanges with the Horn of Africa.3 In the seven-
teenth century, Yemen started to lose its status as an essential port of 
1 (Vallet 2011; Ho 2006) 
2 (Narayan Chaudhuri 1990; Freitag and Clarence-Smith 1997)
3  (Pankhurst 1974)
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call on the trading sea route between East and West, and commercial 
activity began to subside. However, in some parts of the country social 
structures, cultural practices and economic development have been 
profoundly in@uenced by these various migratory movements. Before 
British colonization in1839, Yemenis from Hadramaut and YaB‘i led 
the armies of the Nizam of Hyderabad in India, accumulating small 
fortunes that beneBted their regions of origin. Hadramaut remained 
outside the economic orbit of the British, based in Aden, thanks to 
the wealth of its emigrants and the important role they played as eco-
nomic, religious and political middlemen; they remained strongly 
linked to Asia aMer the country’s formal independence.4 Between 1914 
and 1945, around 30 per cent of Hadramaut’s population lived in India, 
Singapore, Indonesia or East Africa, and the island of Java was home 
to 70,000 Yemeni residents. 
;e impact and consequences of emigration could – and still can 
– be seen in the Asian-in@uenced architecture of Tarim. Likewise, 
emigrants have bought into the property market in Sana‘a.5 Social 
credit earned by emigrants who have ‘made good’ abroad has some-
times disturbed traditional hierarchies based on tribal ties.6 New 
forms of social stratiBcation created by emigration and urbanization 
are now superimposed on territorial and tribal hierarchies. In some 
contexts, emigration could also contribute to improving the status 
or living conditions of women (through additional responsibility but 
also a heavier workload in rural areas, due to the absence of men) and 
of young people (who were partially emancipated through migration 
from patriarchal authority), as well as men who were outcasts in the 
tribal system.7 In general, however, emigration, being an almost exclu-
sively male phenomenon, has tended to have a rather negative eEect 
on gender balances: the wives of expatriate workers do indeed beneBt 
from the increase in household income, but only marginally, as they 
oMen remain under the tutelage of a male relative.8 With emigration, 
new transnational networks are gradually extending into local social 
structures, including the tribal system.
Although far less studied, migration between Yemen and the 
Horn of Africa has also contributed signiBcantly to deBning relations 
4 (Carapico 1998, 26-27). 
5 (Wirth 1984)
6 (Manger 2010). 
7 (Tienda and Booth 1991)
8 (Myntti 1984)
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between the Arabian peninsula and the African continent, both 
through the slave trade and through more conventional forms of 
commercial exchange. Traces of the strong political, economic, cul-
tural and migratory bonds uniting the two shores of the Red Sea 
can be found embodied in mythical Bgures belonging both to Arab 
tradition (the popular Queen Bilqis) and Biblical lore (the Queen of 
Sheba). More prosaic realities also bear witness to the importance 
and longevity of ties between the Horn of Africa and Yemen, such as 
the occupation of Yemen by Abyssinians between 526 and 575, and 
the reign between 1060 and 1158 of the Banu Najah (descendants of 
Abyssinian slaves recruited to serve and protect the Ziyadid dynasty).9 
Political relations were further reinforced by the close economic, cul-
tural and social links resulting from Yemeni emigration to Abyssinian 
lands. Settling in the cities but also on the coastal plains of Abyssinia, 
Yemenis integrated easily into a multi-ethnic and multi-confessional 
society, where they worked mainly as tradesmen, entrepreneurs and 
ship-owners. Until 1974 and their expropriation by the regime of 
Haile Mariam Mengistu in Ethiopia, Yemeni merchants held the keys 
to commerce in the Horn of Africa. ;ese transnational ties survive 
to this day in the oFcial commercial networks, in joint African–Ye-
meni Bshing companies, and in organized smuggling between the 
two shores. It is also visible in Yemen through the presence of a popu-
lation of mixed heritage (the muwalladeen) – oEspring of marriages 
between Yemeni emigrants and Ethiopian, Eritrean, Djiboutian and, 
more rarely, Somali women.10 Cross-migration experiences ended up 
forging a speciBc identity for Yemeni expatriates. ;e ethnography of 
mobility and multicultural families is particularly visible in the bor-
der regions of Yemen, such as the Tihama, a coastal area along the 
Red Sea touching the Saudi border to the north, where generations 
of expatriates live together in a rural society that is simultaneously 
mixed and intensely segregated. 
Contemporary migrations: oil and politics
;e second half of the twentieth century saw the advent of a type of 
short-range mass mobility that could be referred to as ‘oil emigration’, 
when Yemen was one of the labour reservoirs for its oil-producing 
neighbours, particularly Saudi Arabia. ;ese migrations have been 
extensively studied in analyses that have largely emphasized the 
9 (Ducatez 2004, 170)
10 See Chapter ??
the changing dynamics of migration in yemen  |  269 
economic and demographic determinants of importing labour.11 
;e prevailing rate of poverty and relatively high population density 
in Yemen contrasted with the relative ‘emptiness’ of the rest of the 
peninsula,12 and a dearth of oil resources has meant that Yemen has 
remained an economic exception in the region. LeM out of the oil-
centred ‘rich man’s club’ that is the GCC, Yemen beneBted indirectly 
from the oil boom through its integration into the regional labour 
market between the 1960s and 1980s.13 Studies of Yemeni migration to 
Saudi Arabia and the Gulf underlined the strong complementarities 
between the two countries, and between the regional sub-areas.14 In 
1975, of the 1.23 million Northern Yemenis who had emigrated, 80 per 
cent were in Saudi Arabia. In 1986, they numbered 1.17 million and in 
1990 1.1 million. As for South Yemen, the 1988 census counted 233,900 
labourers abroad, 76 per cent of whom were in Saudi Arabia. In 1991, 
around 10 per cent of the population of a uniBed Yemen lived outside 
the country, representing a full 54.5 per cent of its active population.15 
A much smaller immigration trend combined with the massive oil 
emigration:16 for the most part, immigrants came to ‘replace’ the local 
qualiBed and semi-qualiBed workers who had resettled in the Gulf 
countries, partly to serve Yemen’s skilled-labour needs. Aden’s popu-
lation rose from 51,500 inhabitants in 1930 to 250,000 in 1967, including 
North Yemenis, South Asians, Somalis and Europeans. In the 1980s, 
in the heyday of programmes of Arab cooperation and economic 
development, nearly 80,000 Egyptians and Sudanese were recruited 
as teachers in North Yemen. Charitable or educational organizations 
funded by Gulf or Saudi money recruited these individuals to work in 
primary and secondary schools, as well as in the universities of Sana‘a 
and Aden. In 2011, Yemen oFcially hosted 500,000 foreign residents, 
mainly hailing from the Sudan, Somalia, Egypt, Iraq, the Palestinian 
Territories and Syria. 
In the 1980s Yemeni emigration slowed down, both in absolute and 
relative terms, because of the rising in@ux of Asian immigrants into 
the Gulf, which was a result of the more restrictive policies applied by 
11 (Beaugé 0988; Bocco et Djalili 1994; Appleyard 1999) (Halliday 1977, Ling 1984; 
Birks, Seccombe and Sinclair, 1988; McMurray 1999). 
12 (Rouaud 1984)
13 (Salame 1999)
14 (Bonnenfant 1977) 
15 (Al-Maytami 1993)
16 (Gavin 1975)
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the oil-producing countries towards Yemenis. ;is change in policy 
was partly caused by fear of the possible in@uence a massive and well-
integrated Arab migrant population might have on the populations 
and societies of the host countries. Until late 1991, Yemenis were the 
largest national group among foreign immigrants in Saudi Arabia, 
making up 27 per cent of residents.17 A small, gradual fall in numbers 
during the 1980s was ampliBed by the ‘migratory shock’ of 1990–91. 
;e Yemeni government having indirectly sided with Saddam Hussein 
during the invasion of Kuwait by refusing to vote in favour of Opera-
tion Desert Storm, King Fahd and the other Gulf monarchs retaliated 
by taking measures against their Yemeni populations, which led to 
the @ight or expulsion of close to one million Yemenis from the GCC 
states. 
;is episode revealed how deeply dependent the country was on 
emigration, as massive repatriation provoked an unprecedented eco-
nomic and social crisis. ;e Central Bureau of Statistics in Sana‘a 
counted 761,979 returning migrants for the year 1991. ;is home-
coming process continued throughout the next three years, swelled 
further by Yemenis @eeing Somalia aMer the fall of Siad Barre in1991. 
A study by the Ministry for Expatriates makes clear that the migra-
tory shock had catastrophic economic and social consequences for 
a newly uniBed Yemen.18 ;e unemployment level rose to 770,000,19 
and the loss in remittances further reduced the resources of house-
holds dependent on transfers from migrant workers. From this point 
on, re-establishing migratory links with Saudi Arabia and other Gulf 
states became a foreign policy priority, alongside support for Yemeni 
labour abroad. Many of the labourers who had leM Saudi Arabia and 
the Gulf in 1991–92 returned there in the second half of the 1990s, but 
17 “Arab versus Asian migrant workers in the GCC countries”, UN Expert Group 
Meeting on International Migration and Development in the Arab Region, Pop-
ulation Division Department of Economic and Social AEairs, United Nations 
Secretariat, Beirut, 15-17 May 2006.
18 Al-mughtaribûn: Ar-râ"d al-asâsî lit-tanmiyya al-mustadâma [Emigrants : an 
essential contribution to sustainable development] Sana’a : Al-Majlis al-Istishârî, 
Wizârat Shu’ûn al-Mughtaribîn [Ministry for Expatriates], 1999. ;e homecom-
ing of Yemeni migrants to the Gulf countries are echoing other return migration 
from East Africa and the Horn in the 1970s. ;e mixed households who @ed 
Addis, Asmara, Djibouti and Nairobi etc. in the 1970s actually emigrated again 
to the petrol-exporting countries in the 1980s, as they found it particularly hard 
to readapt to Yemeni society upon return (Van hear 1998). 
19 (al-Maytami 1993)
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the aggregate falloE in Yemeni emigration and the deterioration of its 
economic situation had by then acquired a structural character.
Table 1: Yemeni Repatriation and Re-emigration 1990–1999
Country of Origin Homecoming migrants New emigrants (estimates)
1990–1991 1997 1998 1999
Saudi Arabia 671,571 700,000 550,000 750,000
Kuwait 46,574 4,000 5,000 2,000
United Arab Emirates 1,574 50,000 65,000 35,000
Qatar 1,763 7,000 22,000 15,000
Bahrain 551 5,000 12,000 8,000
Somalia 40,000 – – –
Total 761,979 766,000 654,000 810,000
Source: Central Bureau of Statistics (Sana‘a), and estimates from Générations 
Arabes : l’alchimie du nombre (Paris: Fayart, 2000).
!e role of remittances
Despite having contained two profoundly diEerent economic systems 
up until 1990 – a strongly centralized market economy prevailing in 
the North, and socialism in the South – the country’s political econ-
omy has been shaped, at both the national and local levels, by the same 
factors: enduring migratory ties and a dependence on remittances. 
;e political management of these @ows and their eEects remains 
controversial,20 and successive Yemeni states (North, South and 
united) have remained ambiguous towards their expatriates, seeking 
to control their diasporas both politically and economically. From its 
creation in 1967, the PDRY relied on migrant remittances to fund its 
economic development and balance its trade deBcit. ;e PDRY had 
about 300,000 citizens working abroad in the 1970s, and the socialist 
republic made active use of its diplomatic relations with Saudi Ara-
bia to promote labour @ows towards this powerful neighbour.21 ;e 
government’s use of Bscal incentives helped increase the level of remit-
tances received from Saudi Arabia from US$33 million per annum in 
1973 to US$268 million in 1978. In addition to Hadramaut, the regions 
20 (Swanson 1979)
21 (Halliday 1990, 162). 
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of Dhala‘, YaB‘i and Aden saw waves of labour migration towards 
Saudi Arabia – but also, to a lesser extent and much earlier, towards 
Great Britain and the United States.22 Since uniBcation, Yemen has 
been relying heavily on remittances and transfers from its diaspora,23 
as well as on international aid. Most of these transfers remain informal 
in nature: they are not processed through the banking system, and 
largely avoid taxation by the Yemeni state. ;e few available statistics 
conBrm the country’s dependence on migration: migrant remittances 
represent a disproportionately large share of Gross National Income, 
even if recent data show that the ratio is declining.24
Table 2: Remittances to Yemen 2000–2010
Total remittances 
(US$)
GNI 
(US$)
Population Remittances as 
% of GNI
Total remittances 
per inhabitant
2000 1.4 billion 9 billion 17.5 million 15.7% 82
2007 1.3 billion 18 billion 22 million 6.7% 70
2010 1.5 billion 24 billion 22.6 million 6.25% 66
Source: Central Bureau of Statistics (Sana‘a), and estimates from Générations 
Arabes : l’alchimie du nombre (Paris: Fayart, 2000).
As elsewhere, there is considerable debate over whether remittances 
have a positive or negative impact on the economy. Capital in@ows 
during the 1970s oil boom may have weakened Yemen’s economy,25 
destabilizing the local production base by increasing imports of food-
stuEs and manufactured goods, and hindering local development by 
inhibiting investment in productive sectors. Evidence shows, how-
ever, that the emigrants’ purchasing power also fed in@ation in the 
property market, principally in urban areas, but that it also increased 
the price of labour. Emigration also absorbed large number of unem-
ployed youth from the 1980s onwards.
22 (Halliday 2010)
23 (Chaudhry 1997, 249)
24 “Yemeni emigrants send home $10 billion over last 7 years”, Yemen Observer, 
2 Feb. 2 2008
25 “Migrant remittances and development cooperation”, Jørgen Carling Interna-
tional peace research institute, 2005.
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Yemen’s position has also been aEected by the 2008 global eco-
nomic crisis. However, despite a fall in 2009,26 remittances remain 
equal to foreign direct investment, and are Bve times more impor-
tant than oFcial development assistance. With good reason, migrant 
remittances are considered less volatile than foreign investment: 
migrants are less likely to stop sending funds to their families. Bled 
dry by internal con@icts and aEected by deadly @oods and droughts, 
Yemen relies more than ever on income from migration. Since 2011, 
the revolutionary upheaval has reinforced the centrality of remit-
tances for household survival. 
Migration as a security threat
As a result of the growing threat from transnational movements of 
armed groups and terrorists since the late 1990s, and of the crises and 
con@icts in Yemen since 2004, migration has been constrained by the 
security agendas of Yemen’s strategic partners – particularly Saudi 
Arabia and the United States. ;e Yemeni authorities have also used 
security issues as bargaining chips in negotiations with regional and 
western partners alike, alternating between cooperation and turning 
a blind eye on cross-border traFcking of all kinds – including infor-
mal migration, which they have sometimes facilitated. 
In the past, diplomatic incidents served to illustrate the importance 
of migration in bilateral relations: for example, in 1973 the PDRY tem-
porarily forbade emigration to Saudi Arabia for certain categories of 
workers.27 Like most states in the Middle East during the second half 
of the twentieth century, both North and South Yemen used migra-
tion as diplomacy,28 combining labour-export and asylum policies 
as major instruments in diplomatic negotiations with their powerful 
neighbours. Yemen lost its privileged access to the Saudi labour mar-
ket in 1990. Control of the @ows of goods and people across its borders 
became an essential goal of Yemen’s relations with its neighbours and 
strategic partners. In practice, however, restriction on emigration 
and border crossings, combined with the reduced availability of work 
visas for Yemenis, simply resulted in much of the migration to the 
Gulf countries becoming clandestine. 
Moreover, with the rise of transnational terrorism in Somalia 
and the Arabian peninsula, all forms of mobility have come to be 
26 Migration and Development Brief 11, World Bank, 2009. 
27 (Lackner 1985, 166 et ;iollet 2011)
28 (;iollet 2011)
274  |  Hélène Thiollet
viewed increasingly suspiciously, and associated with criminal activ-
ity. In this context, the @ows crossing between the Horn and the Gulf 
became a major issue of concern for the neighbouring states – and, 
from 2001 onwards, for Yemen’s partners in the ‘war on terror’. ;us, 
from 2000 onwards, the strategic importance of mobility in its vari-
ous forms (refugees; economic migrants, whether legal or clandestine; 
smugglers and political activists) was re@ected in policies designed to 
securitize the area of transit that is the Red Sea.29 
Negotiations between Saudi Arabia and Yemen about their bor-
ders oFcially recommenced in July 1992 on the basis of the Taif treaty 
(1934), but were interrupted by the civil war in 1994. ;ey led to the 
signing in February 1995 of a Memorandum of Understanding that 
agreed on the creation of a common border and a demilitarized zone 
around it (Article 4). ;e two countries tried to organize joint man-
agement of seasonal pastoral migrations in the region, and increased 
cooperation on the cross-border issues of traFcking in people, weap-
ons and drugs, as well as irregular migration. ;e northern and 
southern border zones of Saudi Arabia are rife with drugs and weap-
ons traFcking. Its border with Iraq has been a key supply line for 
weaponry to the Iraqi insurgency since 2003. Drug traFcking is also 
intense across the borders with the Yemen and Iraq, which are stages 
on the routes used by Iranian and Iraqi networks to pass narcotics 
from Central Asia. Unsurprisingly, the two main issues on the agenda 
of the 2000 Saudi–Yemeni boundary negotiations were the allocation 
of contested oil-Belds (Mareb, Jawf, Hadramaut, Shabwa) and gas-
Belds (Mareb, Jawf), and mechanisms to deal with cross-border @ows 
of goods and persons. 
In the early 2000s, Saudi Arabia’s decision to build a separation 
barrier along the border has been strongly disputed by Yemen. ;e 
construction of the iron fence started in 2008; it was soon reinforced 
on the Saidi side by electric wires, video surveillance, thermal cam-
eras and heavily armed guards. On the Yemeni side, the management 
of smuggling and traFcking involves border patrols and police oF-
cers, as well as networks of smugglers serving both Yemenis and 
immigrants from the Horn of Africa. Smuggling and irregular migra-
tion are the main concerns of Saudi border guards, but controlling 
the borders is also presented as an important part of Saudi Arabia’s 
campaign against armed Islamic militant groups, and in particular al-
Qa‘ida in the Arabian0020Peninsula (AQAP). Since 2003, AQAP has 
29 (Buzan and Waever 2003)
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been using Yemen as a rear base and safe haven from which to strike 
Saudi Arabia, and in 2009 it fully relocated there. Terrorist attacks on 
both sides of the border – such as one targeting Prince Muhammad 
Bin Nayif, the head of the Saudi bureau of Internal Security – have 
served to highlight just how porous this border is. 
Furthermore, an ongoing rebellion against the government, led 
by the late Zaydi political leader Hussain Badr al-Din al-Huthi, has 
disrupted the economy of the northern part of Yemen, as well as gov-
ernment eEorts to manage border @ows jointly with Saudi Arabia.30 
;e numerous actors involved in the con@ict include northern tribes, 
armed groups and rogue army battalions controlling the region’s 
economy and living oE the proBts they draw from illegal border activ-
ities. When they are not organizing it themselves, they beneBt from 
the smuggling of ammunition and small arms. ;e government’s loss 
of control of the border creates the very conditions that allow the con-
@ict to fester (such as an abundant supply of accessible weapons) and 
pushes the local economy towards illegal activities (drugs, clandestine 
migration). For migrants, the cost of passage rises in direct propor-
tion with the number of middlemen involved in controlling access to 
the frontier. In periods of government oEensives in the mountainous 
northern regions of Sa‘ada, migration routes shiM towards the coastal 
plain along the Red Sea. ;e @exibility of these networks makes them 
extremely hard to shut down eEectively. As soon as one organiza-
tion is dismantled or a route disrupted, others spring up. ;e in@ux 
of some 300,000 internally displaced people @eeing from the con@ict 
zone to supposedly safer areas and to Sana‘a has profoundly modi-
Bed the demographic and spatial distribution of populations, further 
complicating the task of managing migratory @ows.
;e border between Yemen and Saudi Arabia is a transit node in 
a wider clandestine and criminal circuit.31 Large human-traFcking 
networks now operate on both sides of the frontier.32 In 2004, the 
30 “Saudi Forces ;wart Weapons Smuggling Operation, Yemeni Suspects Used 
Disguises to Flee Country”, Yemen Post, 3 Septembre 2009.
31 Abdelmuniz Aqlan, director of the Africa Department of the Yemeni Ministry 
of Foreign AEairs thus claimed in 2005 that “very few migrants stay or even want 
to stay in the Yemen. What we have is mainly illegal transit immigration, in par-
ticular from Africa. ;e real question is that of Yemen’s responsibility towards 
the destination countries of this illegal immigration”. Interview, Sana’a, Yemen, 
28th of November 2006.
32 “TraFcking in Persons Report 2009 – Yemen”, United States Department of 
State, June 16 2009. Source: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4a4214802d.
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dismantling of an organization specialized in the use of African chil-
dren as beggars on the streets of Jeddah, Medina and Mecca led to 
the Brst ever sentencing of a smuggler on charges of sexual exploita-
tion in Saudi Arabia. He provided the brothels of Jeddah with Yemeni 
women recruited in the belief they would be employed as domestic 
workers. Child traFcking mainly aEects two distinct groups: Yemeni 
male and female minors from rural backgrounds, and asylum-
seeking minors from the Horn of Africa. ;e victims of this trade, 
whether women or children, are sold in Yemen and Saudi Arabia as 
slave labour or for sexual exploitation. As a side-eEect of commu-
nications between the two countries, there are also cases of hidden 
prostitution or sexual exploitation that take the form of ‘temporary 
marriages’ between young Yemeni girls and Saudi men, which these 
are frequently discussed in the Yemeni press. For ordinary Yemenis, 
anti-Saudi sentiment, stoked by regular accusations of misdemeanour 
and moral turpitude, is mixed with fascination at their neighbour’s 
fantastic material wealth. 
Asylum Seekers and Internally Displaced Persons: 
Contemporary Political and Humanitarian Crises
Yemen has welcomed mass in@uxes of refugees and asylum seekers 
from the Horn of Africa since the 1960s and, paradoxically enough 
in a context of intense instability, the country continues to host 
increasing numbers of asylum seekers, mainly from Somalia and 
Ethiopia. To this ‘refugee crisis’ one should add the number of inter-
nally displaced people, due to a series of con@icts and crises (Sa‘ada 
in the north, mostly since 2009; Abyan in the South in 2011). ;ese 
two crises have had diEerent consequences on Yemen, the second one 
being much more dramatic and disruptive than the Brst. In the con-
text of enduring instability and domestic con@ict, though, the eEects 
of forced mobility, both internal and international, continue due to a 
lack of international attention and support. 
;e war on terror and the security agenda of the GCC states have 
progressively altered Yemen’s welcoming humanitarian policies 
towards asylum seekers since 2000, as the country has experienced 
html [accessed on the 31st of August 2009]. In July 2007, the UNHCR and the 
International Maritime Organization (IMO) called for intensiBed action against 
people traFcking and its tragic eEects in the Gulf of Aden.
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greater diFculties in accommodating international refugees, and still 
serves as a transit location on the way to its richer neighbours. 
Welcoming refugees? Asylum policies and the ‘war on terror’
;e Yemeni state’s own partial unravelling under the pressure of two 
civil wars and the 2011 revolutionary movement, and the increase 
in internal and international migration @ows, have contributed 
more than any other factor to the disruption of Yemen’s benevolent 
approach to managing refugees’ rights. 
Yemen, the only country in the Arabian Peninsula to have signed 
the 1951 Geneva Convention on Refugees, has been a haven for refu-
gees from the Horn of Africa – including Eritreans in the 1970s and 
1980s, and Somali since 1991. ;is liberal policy towards refugees 
from the Horn of Africa has earned the Yemeni government a cer-
tain amount of moral credit and Bnancial support from international 
organizations. Over the past ten years or so, the ever larger numbers 
of asylum seekers, illegal immigrants and refugees arriving from the 
Horn of Africa have changed the political climate in Yemen, and given 
rise to new legislation and judicial procedures.33 Patterns of mobility 
are now challenged in a context fraught with humanitarian emergen-
cies and security-related pressures. In September 2009, the Yemeni 
minister of the interior revised previous estimates to claim that there 
were over one million Somali ‘refugees’ in Yemen,34 and in 2013 the 
post-revolutionary government estimates the number of refugees 
to be between 600,000 and 800,000. Both in 2009 and 2013, oFcial 
sources expressed their concern at the continuous and rising tide of 
asylum seekers – Somalis, Ethiopians, and to a lesser extent Eritreans 
and Djiboutians – arriving on Yemen’s shores. In 2012, of the 230,000 
international refugees and asylum seekers recognized by the UNHCR, 
only 140,000 were ‘of concern’ and under the agency’s protection and 
assistance. Moreover, compared to the data provided by the Yemeni 
government, it could be that up to 85 per cent of the Somali population 
in Yemen are outside the law, either as unrecognized asylum seekers or 
as ‘undocumented’ foreigners. And though the UNHCR tries to take 
account of populations labelled ‘mixed migrations’ (a term coined in 
2006 by High Commissioner Antonio Guterres, referring to @ows 
of asylum seekers, smuggled people and undocumented migrants), 
the agency itself Bnds it diFcult to avoid the dilemmas inherent in 
33  (;iollet 2009).
34 Saba news, Yemeni press agency http://www.sabanews.net/
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the growing ‘criminalization’ of migratory @ows. In fact, the blurred 
distinction between undocumented migration and asylum seeking 
re@ects the rising in@uence of security concerns in shaping Yemen’s 
management of mobility, as well as the changing priorities of its stra-
tegic partners. Identifying and controlling people crossing the Gulf 
of Aden has become a major issue on the security-dominated agenda 
which has made the Horn of Africa a focus of American foreign policy 
since the 1992–94 intervention in Somalia. AMer 2001 the region was 
designated an ‘enemy bastion’ in the war on terror.35 ;e United States 
and the European Union have attempted to ‘pacify’ the Horn of Africa 
by systematically con@ating humanitarian goals (the delivery of food 
aid and famine prevention) with political goals (con@ict stabilization, 
peace negotiations) and security goals (containing terror and piracy). 
;ese policies imply the control and reduction of population @ows, 
piracy and weapons proliferation in the Gulf of Aden. International 
refugees are deemed to be potential jihadi Bghters or arms smugglers, 
feeding the illegal arms-trade networks between the Horn of Africa 
and jihadist groups in Yemen. 
;e High Commission for Refugees has been involved in Yemen 
since 1988, and has had a permanent representative there since 
1992. From that date onwards, the UNHCR, in agreement with the 
Yemeni government, has applied the status of refugee as deBned in 
the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol, and the Commissioner has 
administered refugee issues in Yemen in collaboration with local 
administrations. In the early 2000s, however, the UNHCR agreed to 
transfer legal and material responsibility to the host country. In 2005, 
the agency handed over the power to determine the status of asylum 
seekers to Yemeni authorities. ;e creation of a Central Refugee Reg-
istration OFce within the Department of Immigration, Passports 
and Nationality on 24 December 2005, under the authority of the 
Ministry of the Interior, indicated pervasive oFcial distrust of asylum 
seekers, who are regularly assimilated with illegal migrants. In addi-
tion, the registration oFce neighbours a migrants’ detention centre. 
Five centres were established in the coastal provinces (Ta‘iz, Hodeida, 
Aden, Shabwa and Hadramaut). Regardless of claimants’ nationality, 
administration of asylum requests from African refugees was rou-
tinely devolved to the police. Confronted with the pitfalls of refugee 
status determination by Yemeni institutions, the UNHCR continued 
to oversee the process, especially as numbers continued to rise in the 
35 (Campbell and Johnson Ward 2003)
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late 2000s. In spite of intense activity at the UNHCR reception centres 
in Ahwar and Mayfa‘ah and at the transit centre at Bab al-Mandab, 
only a small minority of arriving refugees decide to claim asylum and 
are transferred to Kharaz camp. Most Africans arriving in Yemen opt 
for ‘spontaneous settlement’ or undocumented livelihood in the main 
urban centres, hoping to cross over to the Gulf countries, and thus 
avoiding registration and the Yemeni authorities.
Exiles in transit or long-term refugees?
During much of the second half of the twentieth century, Eritreans 
formed the largest group of refugees arriving in Yemen. AMer the end 
of Eritrea’s long war of secession from Ethiopia (1962–91), they were 
overtaken by Somali refugees @eeing the chaos that gripped their land. 
Today, Somali asylum seekers are the only ones to receive the prima 
facie status of international refugees, which implies a de facto recog-
nition of the status of a particular group – whether national, ethnic or 
otherwise conceived – as opposed to individual asylum requests. ;is 
status can be conferred by the UNHCR on the basis of an assessed 
situation of grave risk that has caused the group in question to @ee 
its country of origin. Since 2009, Ethiopian refugees have started to 
cross the Gulf of Aden to reach Yemen. In 2013, they represent the 
largest national group of incoming refugees. For Somalis and Ethio-
pians who manage to make it, their future will largely consist of being 
illegal migrants in Saudi Arabia or another Gulf state. In spite of their 
migration plans, most Africans from the Horn of Africa end up being 
stuck in war-torn, impoverished Yemen for much longer than they 
expected. With an ever-diminishing range of legal opportunities to 
continue the journey to GCC countries, asylum seekers tend to turn to 
smugglers. ;e securitization of mobility and anti-immigration poli-
cies at the regional and international levels eventually ends up fuelling 
criminal networks in a self-perpetuating cycle of insecurity.
Asylum seekers and migrants from Somalia and Ethiopia, trav-
elling along routes run by human traFckers, arrive on the southern 
coast of Yemen via the Indian Ocean and Blter through to a dozen 
or so entry points. Many of them try to reach the Gulf states directly, 
without going through registration either by the UNHCR or the 
Yemeni authorities. Bir Ali, west of Mukalla, is the most widely 
known entry point for illegal @ows of this kind, which start from the 
regions of Puntland and Somaliland. Events such as the 2009 Bghting 
in Mogadishu and central Somalia between government forces and 
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the al-Shabab and Hizb al-Islam militias, and the famine of summer 
2011, created a large exodus of Somalis. ;ese populations, ‘internal 
refugees’ in their own country, converge in large numbers towards 
the eastern governorates, seeking haven in the relative stability of 
Somaliland and Puntland, and hoping to make their way to the GCC 
countries via Yemen. 
Flows of asylum seekers peak every autumn: the favourable winds 
of late August and early September mark the beginning of the ‘season 
of migrations’. In its earliest published statistics on the matter, in 2006, 
the UNHCR recorded about 25,000 people crossing the Gulf of Aden, 
most of them Somali; in 2007, that Bgure was 77,000, and in 2011 it 
reached 103,000. In the single month of November 2011, 12,500 Soma-
lis, Ethiopians, Eritreans and Djiboutians were recorded as landing 
on the southern coast of Yemen.36 Overall, these statistics record that 
the migrants consist of 27 per cent Somalis and 63 per cent Ethiopi-
ans and Eritreans, although the ascription of nationality is sometimes 
haphazard and questionable. 
[Q: So who are the remaining 10 per cent?]
Based on Yemeni government assumptions, we can surmise that 
up to 85 per cent of the refugee population in Yemen remains there 
illegally. Moreover, a second generation of refugees is growing up 
there with no clear legal status. Reactions among Yemenis range 
from everyday forms of xenophobia to genuine attempts at integra-
tion. ;us, in the deprived districts of Basatin in Aden and Al SaBya 
in Sana‘a, marginalised Yemeni populations coexist with the various 
historical strata of immigration from the Horn. 
A maBa-style economy has sprung up around illegal crossings at 
both ends of the journey, and has rapidly become institutionalized in 
areas already strongly marked by violence and criminal activity. Cor-
ruption in the local administration means that these networks operate 
with near-impunity. Passage across the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea 
is part of a larger economic system including piracy, smuggling, and 
the traFcking of weapons and drugs. 
Internal displacement: protracted crises, con'icts 
36 UNHCR, 2011 http://www.unhcr.fr/4ec68a97c.html [link accessed on the 17th 
of November 2011]
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and the Yemeni uprising
Internal displacement is not new to Yemen. It pre-dates the revolu-
tionary ‘moment’ and the political turmoil that started in January 
2011. Political problems in the PDRY aMer 1969, 1978 and 1986 had 
already led to signiBcant displacements, particularly from south to 
north. In addition to political upheavals, there have also been numer-
ous natural disasters, such as the @oods of 2008, which aEected the 
governorates of Hadramaut, Lahej, Al Mahrah and Ta‘iz, and which 
displaced over 25,000 people. ;e Brst main @ows of internally dis-
placed persons (IDPs) in the 2000s were reported during the Sa‘ada 
war (2004–10). Inhabitants of the northern governorates @ed their 
homes, escaping combat and violence in the city and its surround-
ing areas but also bombings by the Yemeni state, and in 2009 by the 
Saudi air force. In the south a limited number of people were dis-
placed as con@ict escalated between the Hiraak al-Junubi and State 
troops. In 2011 part of Abyan governorate was temporarily occupied 
by the Islamist Ansar al-Sharia group, which is linked to al-Qa‘ida in 
the Arabian Peninsula; it managed to establish an enclave in March 
2011, which it renamed the Islamic caliphate or emirate; the area was 
recaptured by government troops in June 2012. During this episode 
thousands of inhabitants were displaced, and most of them took ref-
uge in Aden city.
A variety of estimates have been given for number of people 
internally displaced in 2012 by the two con@icts: the government of 
Yemen gives the Bgure of 545,318, while OCHA gives 430,000, and the 
UNHCR gives 310,000, of whom 175,000 have been assisted by the 
agency.37 By 2013 a signiBcant proportion of them had returned home, 
but the issue of the number of IDPs remains subject to considerable 
political pressure. More than 60 per cent of them are found in the 
northern governorates of Hajja and Sa‘ada, while the remaining 40 per 
cent are in the South, mostly in Aden, and to a lesser extent Abyan. 
Displacement induced by political unrest and con@ict tends to 
become protracted, and also to involve local economic crisis and 
social disruption. Ad hoc support in circumstances of natural disaster 
is easily obtained from various international institutions and private 
actors. In 2008, for example, the Organization of the Islamic Con-
ference, the UN, and private entities such as the oil company Total 
37 “Yemen. Internal displacement continues amid multiple crises”, 17 December 
2012, Internal Displacement Monitoring Center. Source: http://www.internal-
displacement.org/8025708F004BE3B1/(httpInfoFiles)/8D24A4E89B93B100C125
7AD70052594B/$Ble/yemen-overview-dec2012.pdf [accessed Jan. 10 2013]
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provided emergency assistance for those displaced by environmental 
disaster. When it comes to politically induced displacement, however, 
humanitarian assistance has been limited, and is very late in reach-
ing the ‘population of concern’. In Sa‘ada particularly, even though 
displacement had been monitored as early as 2007, aMer the end of 
the fourth round of con@ict, only a few agencies – Islamic Relief, the 
UNHCR, Médecins Sans Frontières – managed to maintain a pres-
ence during the Bghting. No relief was provided to most of Sa‘ada or 
to parts of Hajjah, Amran, Sana‘a and Jawf governorates, which were 
subject to both government and rebel blockades.38 Since the ceaseBre 
in 2010, the political upheaval and the transition taking place in Sana‘a 
has leM the management of IDPs almost entirely under the responsi-
bility of local NGOs and international humanitarian agencies, under 
the auspices of the Yemen Humanitarian Response Plan (YHRP). But 
the local population has been hosting the displaced in schools and 
hospitals, thus making it impossible for these institutions to function 
normally. In spite of international support, both IDPs and refugees 
remain particularly vulnerable to localized violence and predation. 
Far from being solved by the relative stability restored in the north 
by the ceaseBre, by the political transition in Sana‘a, by the govern-
ment capture of Abyan, or by the drone-war against Islamist insurgent 
groups by the US military in the south, the issue of population dis-
placement seems to be entrenched as an aspect of the generalized 
social and political instability of the country, with dramatic economic 
consequences including unemployment, declining household income, 
a lack of access to schools and health services, malnutrition, and so 
on. 

Migration is a critical dimension of Yemen’s economy and inter-
national political situation. A land of haven, exile and transit, Yemen 
has based part of its economic development on enduring migratory 
ties with its neighbours. Yemeni society and economy are intimately 
38 See page 18 in “Yemen. Internal displacement continues amid multiple crises”, 
17 December 2012, Internal Displacement Monitoring Center. Source: http://
www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004BE3B1/(httpInfoFiles)/8D24A4E8
9B93B100C1257AD70052594B/$Ble/yemen-overview-dec2012.pdf [accessed Jan. 
10 2013]
the changing dynamics of migration in yemen  |  283 
connected to regional and global mobility networks involving people, 
ideas and goods, and emigration has represented an important vector 
of economic and Bnancial stability for the country. Population trans-
fers, Yemeni emigration towards the Gulf, and immigration from 
the Indian subcontinent and Africa are all part of a long-standing 
pattern of regional and international movements. As we have seen, 
however, Yemen has suEered increasing pressure from a number of 
sources throughout the 1990s and 2000s, which have contributed to 
the constriction of inward and outward migratory @ows. ;e end 
result has been a weakening of the country’s economic and political 
balance. In this respect, the loss of remittances and the abrupt return 
of its migrant population from the Gulf in 1990 highlighted just how 
dependent Yemen has been on emigration. 
Two issues stand out: Brst, the economic and political weight of 
the Yemeni diaspora and the central place it occupies as a contested 
resource for both government and opposition; second, the implemen-
tation of asylum and integration policies, and the use of those policies 
as bargaining chips in the international arena. Despite its importance, 
the overall question of migration has remained largely absent from 
the political agenda, which tends to be dominated by internal con@icts 
and development issues. 
;e deterioration of political conditions in Yemen since 2004 
has created a climate of instability that has led in turn to increas-
ingly informal migratory networks and paths to exile. As a result, 
the security-orientated management of migration @ows that has pre-
vailed over Yemeni asylum and migration policies in the course of the 
past two decades, under the in@uence of demanding neighbours and 
powerful patrons, has largely failed. ;e distinction between, on the 
one hand, criminal and political networks of migration, character-
ized by traFcking, con@ict and terrorism, and, on the other, asylum 
and economic-migratory networks, is increasingly hard to draw, since 
the former increasingly use the same routes and agents as the latter. 
Responsibility for securing maritime and terrestrial border cross-
ing points has been taken over by Western powers with a military 
foothold in the region (NATO, the United States and the European 
Union), and has become less responsive to local concerns, at a time 
when the costs and dangers of expatriation have risen for migrants 
and asylum seekers alike. With the unravelling of the Yemeni state, 
the extension of violence on both sides of the Red Sea and the Gulf 
of Aden, and increasing sources of economic hardship and ecological 
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distress, mass movements of emergency-stricken populations seem 
set to intensify in both Yemen and the Horn of Africa. 
*** FURTHER READING TO FOLLOW ***
